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Summary findings
Hoekman and Mavroidis analyze  the new Government  "multilatcralized." Its disciplines  apply only to World
Procuremcnt Agrecment (GPA)  that was negotiated  Trade Organization (WTO) members that have signed it.
between a subset of General Agrcement  on Tariffs and  Public procurement represents  a major source of
Trade (GAIT) members in the Uruguay Round, focusing  demand for goods and services  in most countries.
especially  on the expansion of coverage to scrvices  and  Getting domestic procurement policies 'right"  can
on the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms.  therefore have major effects on welfare. And improving
Covcrage objectives  were substantially  achieved,  developing countrics' access  to global procurement
although commitments  contain many exceptions for  markets could help induce governments to adopt
services.  The transparency of signatories' procurement  multilateral rules, if those could be shown to be in their
practices was enhanced and enforcement provisions  were  interests.
strengthened, particularly  by the introduction of a bid-  Hoekman and Mavroidis  explore why only a limited
protest challenge mrechanism,  which allows private  number of countries have signed the GPA.  They suggest
parties (firms)  to invoke the Agreement before national  the pursuit of tariffication as one avenue through which
courts. (A  potential problem: domestic courts could  the Agreement might be expanded to cover all WTO
produce divergent interpretations of the GPA.)  members. In the process, the GPA could be improved
Unlike most of the other Tokyo Round codes  - for  economically  by eliminating  current provisions  that
example, the agreemcnts on technical barriers to trade  allow for measures with quota-like effects, and by
(standards),  import licensing,  customs valuation,  weakening incentives  to seek 'absolute" sector-by-sector
subsidies,  and antidumping  - the GPA could not be  reciprocity.
This  paper - a product of the Private  Sector and Finance  Team, Europe  and Central Asia,  and Middle  East  and North Africa
Regions,  Technical  Department-  is part of a larger  effort in  the department to monitor  agreements  of interest to the region.
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The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)--originally  negotiated during the Tokyo
Round--was renegotiated for the second time during the Uruguay Round.  It is one of the WTO's so-
called Plurilateral Agreements, in that its disciplines apply only to those WTO Members that have
signed it.  In contrast to most of the other Tokyo Round codes--e.g., the agreements on technical
barriers to trade (standards), import licensing, customs valuation, subsidies, and antidumping--the
GPA could not be 'multilateralized'.  With the reintroduction of agriculture and textiles and clothing
into the GATT, procurement has therefore become the major 'hole' in the coverage of the GATT.
The main objective of the GPA has always been--and renains-to  subject government
procurement to international competition.  To accomplish this objective, the Tokyo Round GPA
extended the GATT obligations of national treatment, MFN and transparency to the tendering
procedures of govermnent entities.  The trade-off for such far-reaching obiigations, however, was a
restrictive coverage, insofar as the GPA applies only to those entities included on the schedules
submitted by signatory nations.  The renegotiation of the GPA during the Uruguay Round focused on
further expansion of its coverage, strengthening of its enforcement provisions, and addressing the
factcrs perceived by developing countries that inhibited themn  from  signing the Agreement.  These
constraints related both to the substantive provisions of the GPA and to the 'conditionality'  imposed
by members concerning the entity offers made by nonsignatories when negotiating accession.  The
main objectives in terms of coverage were to extend the entity coverage to include sub-central and
quasi-governmental bodies, and to cover procurement of teleconnnunications, heavy electrical and
transportation equipment, as well as government purchases of services.
Negotiators made significant progress with respect to coverage and enforcement, but were not
successful in expanding membership.  The coverage objectives were substantially achieved, although
comnmitments  contain many derogations regarding services.  Enforcement provisions were
strengthened, in particular by the introduction of a bid-protest challenge mechanism.  These are very
innovative for the GATT-MTN system in that they allow private parties (firms) to invoke the GPA
before national courts.  In the process, however, potential problems have been created, due to the
possibility of diverging interpretations of the GPA by domestic courts.  Much was done to enhance
transparency of procurement practices of signatories, although further strengthening could be achieved
by requiring that the publication of contract awards (already required) include a brief motivation of
decisions (presently not required).
Membership of the GPA remains limited.  Indeed, at the entry into force of the new GPA
there may be fewer signatories than at the beginning of the Uruguay Round.  Two of the Parties to
the Tokyo round code did not sign the new GPA.  Inducing greater participation through
'multilateralization' of the GPA is the main challenge facing policymakers.  Public procurement
constitutes a large source of demand for goods and services in most countries.  Getting domestic
procurement policies 'right'  therefore can have large welfare effects.  At the same time, improving
developing country access to global procurement markets could help to induce Govermnent's to adopt
multilateral rules if these can be shown to be in their interests.  Perhaps the most immediate source of
urgency stems from a provision in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which calls
for negotiations on govermnent procurement of services to be initiated within two years of the entry
into force of the WTO (i.e., by January 1997).  The rules and procedures that are negotiated will be
important in determining the potential for growth in developing country exports of services.Pursuit  of tariffication  could  be an avenue  through  which  membership  in the GPA can be
expanded  in the future.  In the process,  the GPA could be improved  from an economic  perspective  by
eliminating  current provisions  that allow for measures  with quota-like  effects,  and weakening  the
incentives  to seek 'absolute' reciprocity  on a sector-by-sector  basis. More generally,  research efforts
are required  to identify  possible  approaches  towards extending  multilateral  disciplines  for procurement
of goods  and services  that will be beneficial  to developing  countries,  and thus be helpful  in
formulating  negotiating  positions  and strategies. Such research  should  analyze  in greater  depth the
economics  of the GPA's mles and disciplines,  investigate  what the impact  of the Agreement  has been,
expand  the knowledge  of current  procurement  policies  in non-member  countries,  and quantify  the
importance  of procurement  markets  in major selected  OECD and developing  countries.Introduction
The Agreement on Government Procurement--originally  negotiated during the Tokyo Round-was
renegotiated for  the second time  during  the Uruguay Round.  The new  Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA), signed in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994, will enter into force on January 1, 1996.
It is one of the WTO's so-called 'Annex IV' or Plurilateral Agreements, in that its disciplines apply only
to those WTO Members that have signed it.'  In contrast to most of the other Tokyo Round codes-e.g.,
the agreements on technical barriers to trade (standards), import licensing, customns  valuation, subsidies,
and antidumping-the  GPA could not be 'multilateralized'.  With the reintroduction of agriculture and
textiles and clothing into the GATT, procurement has therefore become the major 'hole'  in the coverage
of the GATT. 2
The main objective of the GPA has always been-and remains-to subject government procurement
to international competition. 3 To accomplish this objective, the Tokyo Round GPA extended the GATT
obligations of national treatment,  MFN and transparency to the tendering procedures of government
entities. The trade-off for such far-reaching obligations, however, was a restrictive coverage, insofar as
the GPA applied only to those entities included on the schedules submitted by signatory nations.  While
the entity coverage was somewhat limited initially, it was  contemplated that more entities would be added
as the result of the periodic renegotiations called for in the Agreement.
Given the sensitive nature  of procurement decisions and a  tradition of buy national policies
prevalent in many signatories,  it is not surprising that during the first few years  of implementation
sigr .ttories notified numerous instances of noncompliance  in GATT Committee meetings. Inadequacies
in publishing tender notices, maintaining response deadlines too short for bid  submissions, and not
notifying unsuccessful bidders were some of the issues that were discussed.  Although some of these
problems were of a start-up nature, practices found objectionable  to certain countries appeared with some
regularity on  the agenda  of  Committee  meetings.  Examples included  the  use  of  noncompetitive
procurement procedures such as single tendering (asking only one firm to submit a bid) and the practice
by some countries of splitting large contracts into smaller lots so as to fall below the threshold minimum
1/ Membership  of the GPA is only open to WTO Members. Signatories  to the new GPA are Austria, Canada,
the EU, Finland,  Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway.  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and the United  States.
2/ There  are four plurilateral  agreements:  the GPA, the civil aircraft agreement,  and the arrangements  on
bovine  meat and dairy  products. As the civil aircraft  agreement  encompasses  most producers,  the lack of
multilateralization  has no serious  implications. See Jackson  (1989)  and Hoelkman  and Stem (1993)  for a
discussion  of the codes.
SI  See Bourgeois  (1982)  and Hoekman  and Stem (1993)  for a description  and discussion  of the Tokyo Round
Agreement. lhe following  paragraphs  draw in part from Hoekman  and Stem (1993).
1specified in the code.  Because noncompliance is often difficult to detect, there are inherently problems
in monitoring the implementation of the GPA and enforcing its rules.  Of particular importance was the
absence of a timely bid protest mechanism in the Tokyo round code, or an adequate remedy if a GATT
dispute settlement panel were to find in the favor of a complainant.
The GPA initially exempted purchases with a value of less than Special Drawing Rights (SDR)
150,000. This was lowered to SDR 130,000 during the first renegotiation of the GPA--initiated in 1983,
with the results entering into force in February 1988.  The amended 1988 Agreement also extended
coverage to rental and leasing contracts, increased the time allowed for bid submission, and required the
publication of information on winning bids.  The second renegotiation of the GPA during the Uruguay
Round focused on further expansion of its coverage, strengthening of its enforcement provisions, and
addressing the factors perceived by developing countries that inhibited  them from signing the Agreement.
These constraints related both to the substantive provisions of the GPA and to the 'conditionality' imposed
by members concerning the entity offers made by nonsignatories when negotiating accession. ',The  main
objectives in  terms  of  coverage  were  to  extend  the  entity  coverage  to  include  sub-central and
quasi-governmental bodies,  and to  cover procurement of  telecomununications, heavy electrical and
transportation equipment, as well as government purchases of services.  Negotiators made significant
progress with respect to coverage and enforcement, but were not successful in expanding membership.
The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the new GPA, taking both a legal and
policy perspective.  Section IT provides a succinct description of the main provisions of the new GPA,
highlighting major differences with the 1988 Agreement. 4 Section m discusses the new GPA's most
innovative feature: its enforcement and dispute settlement provisions.  Section IV turns to the issue of
why membership of the GPA remains so limited; indeed, it actually declined as two countries-Hong
Kong and Singapore-have  not signed it.  Section V concludes.
II.  The GPA
The objectives of the GPA are stated in the Preamble: contribute to greater liberalization and
expansion of world trade; eliminate discrimination among foreign products/services or foreign suppliers;
and enhance the transparency of relevant laws and practices.  The Tokyo Round Agreement included a
provision (Article IX:6(b)) that called for periodic negotiations  to broaden and inprove the GPA on the
basis  of  mutual  reciprocity.  Article  IX:6(b)  explicitly called for  the Committee  on  Goverrmnent
Procurement (the Committee hereafter) to explore at an early stage the possibilities of expanding the
41  Blank  (1994)  and Messerlin  (1994)  are complementary  sources.
2coverage of the Agreement to include service contracts. 5 A significant  broadening of the Agreement was
achieved  during the Uruguay round. Services and construction  became subject to the GPA, and the reach
of the Agreement was extended to sub-centrp3  entities.
Article  I (Scope and Coverage) states that "this Agreement applies to  any law,  regulation,
procedure, or practice regarding any procurement by entities covered by this Agreement, as specified in
Annexes 1-5." The concept of 'procurement' covers all contractual options, including purchase, leasing,
rental and hire-purchase, with or without the option to buy.  The GPA uses a so-called positive list
approach to determine the reach of the Agreement: it applies only to entities that are listed in an Annex.
There are three 'entity Annexes':  Annex I lists covered central govermnent entities; Annex 2 lists sub-
central government entities; and Annex 3 lists "all other entities that procure in  accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement."  Annex 3 is a catch-all category, that includes bodies such as utilities.
Its careful wording allows for the fact that entities that are listed may be partially or totally private.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the term entity is nowhere defined, reflecting the fact that there was no
consensus on what constitutes a  'public undertaking'.  Instead of attempting to  agree on a common
definition, a decision was made to maintain significant flexibility  regarding the entities that could be put
on the table (Messerlin,  1994).6 Article 1:3 operates as an anti-circumvention provision:  if scheduled
entities require7 enterprises not covered to award contracts in accordance with particular requirements,
the two basic nondiscrimination principles (national treatrnent and MFN) apply mutat.s mutandis.
The entities that are listed in the three Annexes are subject  to the rules and disciplines of the GPA
with respect to their procurement of goods and services it  (1) the value of the procurement exceeds
certain specified thresholds;'  and (2) the goods or services that are involved are not exempted from the
coverage of the Agreement.  Table 1 sets out the various thresholds that apply to the procurement of
goods and services for the three types of entities for each of the Parties to the GPA.  Note that there is
some variance between signatories.  Only for central govermment  ent..ies is there a common minimum
threshold of SDR 130,000 for goods and non-construction services. Thresholds can be as high as SDR
5/ The Committee  is composed  of representatives  from the parties  to the GPA. It provides  a forum for the
exchange of information and views, and is the body to which disputes are initially brought.
6/ Article XXIV:6(b) allows for the removal of entities included in one of the Annexes subsequent to "the
effective elimination of government control or influcnce'  over the entity.  The most common way this might
occur is through privatization.  If there is an objection to the removal, dispute settlement procedures may be
invoked.  Signatories may explicitly exclude procurement made by entities if there is competition.  Thus, e.g.,
Japan has stated in its Annex that "This Agreement shall not apply to contracts which the entities award for
purposes of their daily profit making activities which are exposed to competitive forces in markets."
7/ This term has not been interpreted by a GPA dispute settlement panel, but it seems safe to conclude that it
should be interpreted strictly.
8/ Valuation is to take into account fees, premia, commissions, and indirect taxes.  In the case of the EU a
fictive VAT rate of 13 percent must be included (Messerlin, 1994).
315 million for construction services for non-central government entitics. 9 The product coverage of the
Agreement is  also  determined  by the  Annexes.  As  far  as  goods are  concerned,  in  principle all
procurement is covered, unless specified otherwise in an Annex.  Thus, a negative list approach is used
to determine the coverage of  the GPA for procurement of non-defense related goods by scheduled
entities." 0 The procurement of goods by Defence Ministries or similar entities is often subject to a
positive list: only items explicitly scheduled are covered. Procurement of services is also subject to a
positive list: only the procurement by covered entities of services explicitly scheduled in Annexes 4 and
5 are subject to the GPA's rules, and then only insofar as no qualifications or limitations are maintained
in the relevant Annexes.
Many Parties have made explicit derogations to the commitments that are contained in their
Annexes.  These can be  divided into two types.  The first consists of derogation from  the GPA's
nondiscrimination requirement  contained in Article 111. These have been made by the majority of
signatories. They generally specify that Party X will not follow the GPA's nondiscrimination rule to the
procurement by entities listed in Annex Y  to firms originating in Party R,  S, or T "until such time as X
has accepted that the Parties concerned give comparable and effective access for X's undertakings to the
relevant markets.  Note  that this  reflects an explicit requirement of absolute reciprocity on either a
productlservice and/or an  entity  basis.  The second type of derogation pertains to commitments on
services (Annexes 4 and 5), and specifies that services that are listed are covered only to the extent that
other Parties to the GPA have provided reciprocal access to that service.  Canada, Finland, Korea,
Switzerland and the United States have made such derogations.  The mnix  of positive and negative list
approaches for  entities  and  productstservices,  varying  thresholds,  and  the use  of  exceptions  and
derogations makes it difficult to ascertain the effective scope of the GPA.
Basic Principles
The two basic principles  governing the GPA are non-discrimination and  national treatment
(Article III).  The way these two principles have traditionally been understood in the GATT-context is
that the former refers to a legal prohibition to discriminate between foreign products; in the GPA-context,
the rationepersonae-component of the obligation  stays the same, whereas the ratione nmateriae-component
2/ It should  also be noted that the Annexes  of individual  signatories  may specify  higher thresholds  for particular
members  of the GPA in an attempt to ensure reciprocity. For example,  although  the threshold  for construction
services  is SDR  5 million  for the United  States,  the U.S. maintains  a SDR 15 million  threshold  for Korean
firms.
10/ To give some  illustrations,  Austria, Canada,  the EU, Finland,  Norway,  Sweden  exclude  procurement  of
agricultural  products  made in the context  of agricultural  support  programs;  the EU and Switzerland  exempt
contracts  by Annex I or 2 entities relating  to drinking  water, energy,  transport  and telecommunications;  Israel
has exempted  the procurement  of a number  of goods  by its Ministry  of Health; Japan has excluded  procurement
of public  electrical  telecommunications  equipment  by Annex  3 entities;  Korea excludes  procurement  of satellites
for five years; etc.
4is extended  to cover  also a positive  list of services  and  suppliers  of products  and/or services. The latter
refers to a legal prohibition  to discrimn  inate, with respv.,t  to the aforementioned  categories, between
foreign and domestic  sources.  The two fundamental  obligations  apply irrespective  of the customs
treatment  of the products  or services  that will affect  the procurement  contract. Article  M11:3  of the GPA
states to this effect  that  the aforementioned  provisions  "shall  not apply  to customs  duties and charges  of
any kind imposed  on or in connection  with importation,  the method  of levying  such duties and charges,
other import regulations  and formalities, and measures  affecting trade in services other than laws,
regulations,  procedures  and practices regarding  govermnent  procurement  covered  by this Agreement".
Article III:2 further states that each Party 'shall ensure" that its entities  do not discriminate
between  locally-established  suppliers "on the basis  of degree  of foreign  affiliation  or ownership"  or 'on
the basis of the country  of production  of the good  or service  being  supplied". Article  I1I:. is new.  The
old Agreement  spoke only of traded goods. i.e., products originating  within the customs territory
(including  free zones)  of Parties. Under the new  GPA, the words "originating  within .. "  were deleted
from III:1, implying  that it implies to both trade and sales through  establishment. Contrary to first
appearances,  the addition  of Article M11:2  is not redundant,  however. A rationale  for the inclusion  of
Article M:2 may be that the GATT does not have any agreed rules to determine  the origin of locally
established  furms. By including  a blanket  prohibition  on discrimination  against  locally  established  finns,
the need for ascertaining  origin disappears. Article  m incorporates  an obligation  of result: signatories
must ensure that the behavior  of covered  entities  conforms  with the nondiscrinination  principles. The
means of satisfying  this obligation  are not spelled  out.  Parties  are free to choose  whatever  means they
deem  appropriate  to achieve  the agreed result. Inaction  by signatories,  as well as action  to the contrary,
gives adequate  grounds  to affected  Parties for legal proceedings  to be initiated.
Article  m implies  that policies  such  as offsets  are  prohibited  insofar  as they  imply  discrimination.
This prohibition  is stated explicitly in Article XVI, which  forbids developed  countries  to use offsets.
However, developing  countries  may continue  to require  offsets, as long as these are clearly defined,
applied  nondiscriminatorily,  and are not used as a criterion  in awarding  contracts.  "
The Agreement  provides  for four methods  of tendering  (Articles  VII and XIV): open, selective,
limited or through  competitive  negotiations.
rO)  Open tendering  procedures: Any interested  supplier may submit a tender.  This is the
preferred  method. However,  three other methods  are also allowed  for if a number  of conditions
have been  fulfilled. These are:
111  That is, thcy can be conditions  that are specified  in tender  documentation,  but a firm cannot  be awarded  a
contract  on the basis of exceeding  the minimum  offset  requirement  that is imposed.
5(ii) Selective tenderitng  procedtures:  Only those suppliers invited to do so by the entity may submit
a tender.  Entities that desire to  have recourse to thcse procedures should maintain lists of
qualified suppliers that will be interested to bid.  These lists basically establish eligibility criteria
that  have to  be  fulfilled by  applicants that  want to  figure among the  qualified suppliers.
Signatories must publish at least once a year in an agreed publication the lists maintained, their
validity, and the conditions to be satisfied for inclusion, including the methods used by entities
to verify that requirements are met (Article lX:9).
(iii) Lirnited tendering procedures: Under this method an entity contacts suppliers individually.
Article XV of the GPA provides an exhaustive list of justifications for using limited tendering
procedures (previously known as single tendering procedures).  These include the absence of
tenders in response to an open or selective tender, cases of urgency, additional deliveries by an
original supplier, or additional construction services not included by intended to be within the
original contract.  Limited tendering procedures should not be used 'with  a view to avoiding
maximum possible competition or in a manner which would constitute a means of discrimination
among suppliers of other Parties or protection to domestic producers or suppliers".
(iMi)  Negotiated procedures: These may be conducted in the context of procurement in which
entities have indicated their intent to do so, or when it appears from the evaluation that no tender
is obviously the most advantageous in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth in the
notices or tender documentation. Elimination of participants in this context should be carried out
in accordance with the criteria set forth in the tender documentation.  In case of modification of
the criteria, all remaining participants must be accorded an opportunity to submit new offers.
The GPA pays particular attention to ensuring and enhancing transparency.  Article IX governs
the opening of the procedures.  According to this Article, each entity is obliged to publish an invitation
to participate for all cases of intended procurement, except for the case of limited tendering.  Suniunaries
of procurement notices have to be issued in one of the WTO's official languages (English, French or
Spanish).  Notices of planned or proposed procurement must pmovide  a list of all elements needed to
ensure transparency,  including the mode of  procurement, its nature and quantity,  dates of delivery,
economic  and technical requirements, amounts and terms of payment etc. In publication of notices (calls
for tender), entities must  make clear that procurement is covered by  GPA.  Article  VI (Technical
Specifications)  requires that such specifications are not be adopted with the effect of creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade, and where appropriate be expressed in terms of performance rather than
design or descriptive characteristics and be based on international  standards where such exist. For tenders
to be  considered for award,  they must  comply at the time of the opening with the notices and the
conditions of participation (Artici  XIII).  While Article VI is not strongly worded--what is a 'necessary
barrier' to trade; what is appropriate?--the challenge procedure discussed below gives this language some
bite.
6Entities are legally obliged under Lhe  GPA (Article X111:4b)  to award contracts to the tenderer
who "has been determined to bc fully capable of undertaking the contract" anid who is (a) either the
lowest tender; or (b) the tender whiclh  in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forthl  in the notices
or tender docunientation is detcrmined to be the most advantageous. The first of the two conditions to
be  fulfilled requires a  tactual deteniinaiion.  Sonic margin of discretion by the procuring entities is
allowed for in the scnsc that it involvcs, by dcfinition, judgment by the procuring entities on the capacity
of the tenderer to fulfill the contract.  Determination of the lowest tender is in principle unambiguous.
Who best meets the evaluation criteria is opcn to a considerable degree of discretion,  however.  The
binding  constraint  is  therefore the  specific  evalua.ion  criteria  set  forth  in  the  notices  or  tender
documentation.  It would be a violai.on of the Agreement were an entity to consider a tender as the most
advantageous on  the basis  of  evaluation criteria  that  were  no:  specified in  the  notices  or  tender
documentation.
The foregoing requirements do not need to be followed if the procuring entity decides it is in the
public interest not to issue the contract (Article XIII:4(b).  This could prove to be an important loophole
in the Agreement since the public interest is nowhere defined in the Agreement.  The 'public interest'
clause could allow  industrial policy considerations to  be  pursued by  simply delaying contracts  or
reformulating them to better suit domestic bidders.  The 'public interest'  provision, which echoes an
identical provision in the old GPA, has never been interpreted in the GATT case-law.  In part this may
reflect the  fact that  entities have absolute discretion  to  formulate notices with  respect *o technical
specifications within the limits of Article VI.  In principle, technical specifications must be based on
performance rather than descriptive criteria and on international standards where existing.  But,  this
requirement is qualified by the words where appropriate (see above).  This  'appropriateness-test'  is
another potential loophole in the GPA.
There is no obligation in the GPA to adequately motivate decisions.  Such an obligation exists,
for  example, in  other WTO  Agreements (e.g.,  the Subsidies Agreement.  The GPA contains  two
provisions that address this issue in substantially  different ways. Article XVIII:2 states that:  "Each entity
shall, on request from a supplier of a Party, promptly provide:  pertinent informnation  concerning the
reasons why the supplier's  application  to qualify was rejected, why its existing qualification was brought
to an end and why it was not selected; and to an unsuccessful tenderer, pertinent information concerning
the reasons why its tender was not selected and on the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender
selected as well as the name of the winning tenderer".  Article XIX:2 provides that:
The govermnent of an unsuccessful tenderer which is  a Party to  this Agreement may seek,
without prejudice to the provisions under  Article XXII,  such additional information on the
contract award  as  may be  necessary to  ensure  that  the procurement was made  fairly  and
impartially.  To  this  end,  the procuring  government shall provide information on  both the
characteristics and relative advantages of the winning tender and the contract price.  Normally
this latter information may be disclosed by the government of the unsuccessful tenderer provided
7it exercises  this right  with discretion. In cases  where  release  of this information  would  prejudice
competition  in future  tenders,  this information  shall  not  be disclosed  except  after  consultation  with
and agreement  of the party which  gave the information  to the government  of the unsuccessful
tenderer.  "
The need  to motivate  therefore  becomes  operative  only  upon a request  of an unsuccessful  tenderer
or an intervention  of his/her government  to this effect.  As the publication  of the award of contracts
required under the GPA merely has to  identify the successful  tenderer (without any motivation),
justifications only need to be elaborated ex post facto  following a formal request to this effect. This
approach  is at  odds  with  GATT-Agreements  on Subsidies  or Antidumping  and  the GATT  case-law  in this
context,  which  requires  motivation  of decisions.' 2
While entities  must operate within the limits prescribed  by the Agreernent(s)  (e.g., technical
specifications  have  to be established  ea ante), the choice  of specifications  is entirely  the responsibility  of
the procuring  entities. The only limit to their discretion  is the obligation  not to create "unnecessary
obstacles  to international  trade' (Article  VI: 1).  The question  whether  the choice of specifications  is
necessary  or appropriate  in order  to achieve  the desired  outcome  appears  to escape  judicial  review,  unless
the obligation  imposed  by Article  VI: 1 is interpreted  in a wide manner.
III.  Enforcement
There are many  possibilities  through  which  entities  may  attempt  to avoid  the GPA's obligations
on a de facto basis.  'Classic' tactics in this regard that have been brought forward in past GPA
Committee  meetings  are splitting of contracts  to fall below the GPA's threshold,  abuse of technical
specifications,  short deadlines,  non-publication  of calls for tender, and the use of limited tendering
(Hoeknan and Stem, 1993). Although  the new GPA makes renewed  efforts to reduce  the scope for
circumvention-e.g.,  through  setting of deadh. ms;  prohibiting  splitting [Article  II:31,  and establishing
detailed  rules on the contents  of tender documentation  and the award of contracts-without  an effective
bid protest  procedure  such rules may not be very effective  in operational  terms.
An imnportant  innovation  in the new GPA is therefore  the introduction  of a challenge  procedure
(Article  XX). The nature  of procurement  is such  that most of the time, unless  rapid  action  can be taken,
inconsistencies  with the  Agreement  will defacto be tolerated  as finns will not have  an interest  in bringing
cases. The drafters  of the new GPA attempted  to address  the need for bid-protest  mechanisms  (long  on
the agenda  of negotiators)  by the introduction  of the challenge  procedures. According  to Article XX:7,
"challenge  procedures  shall  provide  for:
121  See  for example  the Panel  report  on "Korea-Antidumping  Duties  on Imports  of Polyacetal  Resins  from  the
United  States".  ADP/92,  adopted  on 29 April 1993, §209.
8(a) rapid interim measures to correct  breaches oi the agreement and to preserve commercial
opportunities.  Such action may result in suspension of the procurement process.  However,
procedures  may  provide that overriding  adverse consequences for  the  interests concerned,
including the public interest, may be taken into account in deciding whether such measures should
be applied.  In such circumstances, just  cause for not acting shall be provided in writing;
(b)  an assessment and a possibility for a decision on the justification of the challenge; and
(c)  correction of the breach of the Agreement or compensation  for the loss or damages suffered.
which may be limited to costs for tender preparation or protest.,,  3
Viewed from a procedurAl/legal  point of view this is a rare example in the WTO-system where
private parties can invoke WTO-law before domnestic  courts.  Article XX requires contracting parties to
enact appropriate procedures in order to give effect to their assumed obligation; they have to guarantee
that challenges will be heard by a court or by an impartial and independent body that will respect the
minimmn of due process  (Article XX:6)."  This adjudication body however,  whatever its  form,  is
required to apply the GPA:  this stems unequivocally from the cited Article XX:7 according to which the
bodies will be required to provide rapid interim measures to correct breaches of the Agreement.  Article
XX:8 specifies further that  'with  a  view to the  preservation of the commercial and other interests
involved, the challenge procedure shall normally be completed in a timely fashion."
If viewed from  the effectiveness/efficiency of remedies point of view,  challenge procedures
constitute a  step forward.  The challenge procedures provide what was missing  from the previous
Agreement, namely the possibility of speedy action against violations of GPA rules and disciplines.  This
is probably their main contribution.  Even in cases where panels are bold enough to suggest "restiuzio
in integrum"  as a remedy for illegally awarded contracts, there is always the possibility of excessive
onerousness.  Moreover,  as  a  general rule, preventive  action is,  in  principle,  more  effective than
corrective action er post.
There are possible negative implications however. These are related to the interpretation of the
GPA:  in principle, all signatories have been put in a position to interpret the Agreement in what could
be divergent ways.  Signatories of the GPA could provide the legal possibility to appeal at the domestic
level against decisions in this context. Moreover, signatories always retain the possibility to bring a case
before a GATT-panel if they believe that domestic courts have misinterpreted the GPA.  To the extent
131  It should be noted  that in their Annexes  signatories  may make derogations  on the applicability  of Article
xx.
141 If not a court, a review  body must be subject  to either judicial review  or have procedures  prviding for
hearings,  represenmtion,  access  to all procdings,  witnesses,  wnitten dedsions and disclosure  of documents.
9that GATT panel reports  do not constitute binding precedents, nothing guarantees that a  degree of
homogeneity in the case law in this area will be preserved, and thus legal security.  This problem could
prove to be rather serious given that the basic object of the challenge procedures is to provide for timely
remedies.  Any non-challenge in this context could theoretically amount to tolerance of inconsistencies
if the ruling of the Trondheim panel was adhered to in the future.' 5 Consequently, much depends on
the diligence and the good faith of the signatories that put into place and apply the challenge procedures.
The GPA's dispute settlernent procedures are contained in Article XXII.  Basically, the original
structure of consultations/panel procedures is preserved:  recourse to panel procedures is an option if
bilateral consultations fail to produce a satisfactory result.  Article XXII:  1 slates that "the provisions of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing  the Settlement of Disputes under  the WTO
Agreement...  shall be  applicable  except  as  otherwise  specifically provided".  What  follows  will
concentrate on the distinctive features of the GPA.  Article XXII:2  recognizes two forms of legal
complaints: violation complaints, where the object of the dispute is an alleged violation of the Agreement
and non-violation complaints, where, notwithstanding the consistency of a particular measure with the
Agreement, rights and benefits of signatories have been nullified or impaired.  Thus, the third form of
legal complaint known in the GATT legal system, the situation complaint, has been left out of the GPA-
context.  This is a rather unimportant ornission, since it is difficult to imagine complaints other than
violation and non-violation.'6
All requests for establishment of Panels will be forwarded to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),
the WTO-organ responsible for establishing panels, adopting panel and Appellate Body reports, making
recommendations or giving rulings on the matters before it, maintaining surveillance of implementation
of rulings and  recommendations, and  authorizing suspension of concessions and  other obligations.
However, because the GPA is a 'plurilateral' agreement, members of the DSB are restricted to signatories
of the GPA when addressing disputes arising under GPA auspices.
Although the procedures  established in  the WTO-Understanding on  Dispute  Settlement are
applicable, an interesting particularity of the GPA concerns remedies. The WTO Understanding nowhere
specifies applicable remedies, implying that all public international law remedies are applicable in the
WTO-context. The GPA also refrains from specifying applicable remedies, so that all public international
law remedies are applicable here as well.  The GPA goes beyond the WTO-Understanding, however, by
15/ As discussed  in Mavroidis  (1993),  in the Trondheim  case the panel found  that the procurement  procedures
that were employed  violated  the GPA. However,  the panel also concluded  that it was too late to remedy  the
situafion  and decided  to accept  an undertaking  by Norway that the procedures  that were followed  would  not be
repeated  in the future.
161 Situation  complaints  have never been pursued  in the GATT-context.  According  to Petersmann  (1991) they
have  fallen in desuetude. Only in one instance  has there been a threat of bringing  a situation  complaint  before a
panel (EC v. Japan), see Hoekman  and Mavroidis  (1994).
10stating that the DSB shall have, inter alia, the competence  to authorize "consultations regarding remedies
when withdrawal of measures found to be in contravention of the Agreement is not possible" (Article
XXII:3).  This  provision appears  to have been introduced because of  the dissatisfaction of  some
signatories with the panel ruling on the Trondheim case on remedies.  'While panels could normally be
expected to decide on the appropriateness of a particular remedy taking into account the facts of the case,
here the initiative is explicitly delegated to the parties to the dispute.  It is difficult  to justify this shift of
initiative on legal grounds, especially given that public international law remedies are not circumscribed
at all.
Article 3:7 of the WTO-Understanding states that "in the absence of a mutually agreed solution,
the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements'"*7
Article 3:7 reproduces a provision of the 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement.  Although this
constituted a description of the 'state of the art' at that point in time, the WTO-Understanding is not an
agreed description of what customarily has happened in panel procedures.  Since 1979 a number of panels
have gone beyond the 'usual'  ex nunc GATT-remedy.  'Usual'  remedies have been suggested in the
majority  of  the  cases,  but  other,  types  of  remedies  have  been  recommended  as  well  (e.g.,
reimbursement).  It is nowhere implied that 'unusual' remedies create a presumption of inconsistency.
Since the Trondheim case, a number of signatories have revealed their dissatisfaction with panel rulings
tat  were limited to ex nunc remedies in the GPA-ontext,  presumably because of their ineffectiveness.
Additionally, members of the GPA can reach mutually acceptable, bilaterally negotiated solutions (see
above) that, in principle, can also go beyond the 'usual' remedy.  It appears therefore that WTO-members
did not want to state explicitly what implicitly is already within the realm of competence of WTO-
adjudicating bodies with respect to remedies.
The provision allowing fcr bilaterally negotiated remedies could prove to be very interesting if
viewed as evidence of state practice in the field of remedies. Since the WTO-Understanding  is applicable
if not  superseded by the provisions of the GPA, an assessment of the legal value of such bilateral
solutions should start there.  According to Article 3:6 of the WTO-Understanding "mutually agreed
solutions to  matters formally raised under the consultation and  dispute settlement provisions  of the
covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees, where any
member may iaise any point relating thereto".  Thus, GPA-signatories that have reached a biaeral
solution-after  authorization by the DSB to initiate such consultations-will  have to notify the outcome to
the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees.  The nature of the points that any member might
raise is not defined.
17/ Emphasis  added.
11What might happen in cases where a bilateral solution is reached and notified and some members
think it is inconsistent with the Agreement?  Article 3:5 of the WTO-Understanding is relevant here,
where it is stated that all solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation  and dispute settlement
procedures shall be consistent with the Agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to
any other member, nor shall they impede the attaimnent of any objective of the covered agreements.
Were one  to interpret the two Articles in  a way consistent with  the obligations stemming from the
multilateral context, the starting point should be that only panels can pronounce on the consistency of
solutions  reached.  To judge otherwise would  mean that consistency with the Agreement could be
established at the bilateral level.  This,  however,  could in tum provide an  impediment to  reaching
bilateral solutions: Article 3:5 makes it clear that both systemic and trade interests could be taken into
account.  Theoretically, one could imagine a situation where panels could be requested to examine the
consistency of remedies granted in a  purely bilateral context that  never reached the stage of  panel
procedure.  What is not specified though, is to what extent third parties have standing before a panel in
cases where bilateral solutions do not affect their trade interests. The crucial question in such cases will.
consequently, be the consistency of the remedies agreed at the bilateral level with The GPA.  This might
constitute a future avenue for the WTO to embark on a serious-and unfortunately, still elusive-discussion
on remedies in the WTO-context.
Concerning the time-limits applicable in dispute settlement, the GPA contains a particularity
compared to the WTO-Understanding. Normal panel procedures should not exceed 6 months, with the
possibility of extension up to 9 months in specific circumstances. In the GPA a clause is inserted stating
that every effort shoul2 ' - -.  .ade to limit the duration of panel proceedings to 4 months, and to 7 months
at the very most.  This is however, a best-edeavors  clause, and, consequently, not legally binding.
Exceptions
Article XXII  contains an exhaustive list of legal grounds that can justify action by the signatories
that is inconsistent with the Agreement.  It is divided in two sub-paragraphs: (a) a national security
exception; and (b) a list of other justifications as long as they are not being 'applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the smne
conditions prevail  or  a  disguised restriction  in  international trade".  The list covers measures:  (i)
necessary to protect public morals, order or safety; (ii) necessary to protect human, animal, plant life or
health;  (iii) necessary to  protect  intellectual property;  (iv) relating to  the products  or  services  of
handicapped persons, of philanthropic institutions or of prison labor.  The GATI  case law in this field
will be  of  relevance, particularly  insofar  as the  "necessity" principle has been incorporated as  the
appropriate criterion to judge actions taken by administrative authorities.
12IV.  Developing  Countries and Expanding Membership
Membership  of the GPA is quite limited. As mentioned  previously,  the Agreement  has only 11
signatories  (counting the EU as one).  Although its Members account  for a large share of global
government  procurement,  the absence  of broad-based  participation  is a source of concern. During  the
1980s  it was probably  fair to say that  much  of the problem  was the 'newness'  of the GPA. But after 15
years,  any uncertainty  regarding  the  potential  benefits  of participation  should  have  disappeared. The fact
that  Membership  remains  so limited  suggests  that  non-Members  perceive  the  costs of  joining to outweigh
the  benefits. What is wrong with the GPA? What  needs  to be done  to expand  membership  significantly?
These questions are  important, not just because there is a  large 'hole'  in the GATT, as public
procurement  corLstitutes  a large source of demand  for goods and services  in most countries, but also
because  the General  Agreement  on Trade in Services  (GATS)  contains  a provision  calling  for negotiations
on government  procurement  of services  to be initiated  witbin  two years of the entry into force of the
WVTO  (i.e., January  1997).'l'
The obvious hypothesis  in this regard is that non-members  desire to be able to discriminate
against  foreign products or suppliers  when awarding  contracts. The fact that attempts were made to
weaken  the reach of the GPA's non-discrimination  principles  for developing  countries  suggests  that this
is indeed  the case. Although in principle  no discrimination  is allowed in favor of domestic firms by
covered  entities, Article V:4 of the GPA allows  developing  countries  to negotiate  "mutally acceptable
exclusions  from the rules on national  treatment  with respect  to certain  entities,  products,  or services  that
are included  in their lists of entities." Such negotiations  may also be initiated  expost, after signing  the
agreement  (Article  V:5).  Some  scope  therefore  exists for, e.g., maintaining  a price preference  policy.
However,  the option  is limited  to certain  entities,  products  or services,  and is therefore  inherently  limited
by the relative  negotiating  power  of the country  seeking  accession.
Article XVI of the GPA allows developing  countries, at the time of accession, to negotiate
conditions  for the use of offsets  (e.g., domestic  content requirements).  This is a new provision,  in that
the Tokyo round agreement  had only weak disciplines  on the use of offsets."  Under the new GPA
offsets  have  been prohibited  for industrialized  countries,  but remain  possi'ble  for developing  countries,
thus explicitly allowing for  de facto  discrimination  against foreign suppliers.  However, offset
requirements  may only be used for qualification  to participate  in the procurement  process and not as
criteria  for awarding  contracts,  and  conditions  are to be objective,  clearly  defined  and non-discriminatory.
Thus, although  in principle  allowed-if  negotiated  during accession-offsets  may  only  be used  as necessary
18/ See Hoekman  (1994) for a brief  review  of the GATS.
19/ Art. V:14(h)  stated,  inter  alia, that 'entities  should  normally  refrain  from  awarding  contracts  on the
condition  that  the supplier  provide  offset ... opporunities ... In the limited  number  of cases where such
requisites  are part of a contract, Pardes  concerned  shall limit the offset to a reasonable  proportion  within  the
contract  value  ..
13conditions.  If a firmn  offers  local content that greatly exceeds the minimum required offered by its
competitors, this may not be a factor in awarding contracls.  As offset policies are very prevalent in
developing countries.  Article  XVI  appears to  have  been  worded with  the concerns of  expanding
participation in mind.  As disciplines on offsets were weak under the old code, however, Article XVI
does not constitute  a new 'incentive'  to join.  Moreover, offsets are likely to be subject to negotiation.
Israel has committed itself in its Annex that the maximum local content required is 35 percent for the first
five years of the Agreement, dropping to 30 percent for the next four years, and 20 percent thereafter.
While offset requirements may be discriminatory in the sense that foreign firms are forced to use
more local inputs than might be optimal from a profit maximizing perspective, they apply to locally
established firms as well.  A price preference policy discriminates more explicitly in favor of domestic
firms.  Interestingly, the choice that was made to allow offsets but prohibit price preferences is the
opposite of what economic theory suggests regarding the welfare implications of these two policies.
Although a case can be made in favor of price preferences in certain circumstances, domestic content
provisions are usually inefficient  instruments.  As  emphasized by  McAfee and  McMillan (1989),
discriminatory procurement policies may be welfare improving, depending on the market structure of the
industry  and the type of  good  involved.  In principle,  nondiscriminatory procurement policies  are
therefore not necessarily optimal.  Procurement costs may be lowered by pursuing price preferences if
domestic firms have a competitive disadvantage  in producing the product, and only a limited number of
firms (foreign and domestic) bid for the contract. In the absence of a preference policy, in such a context
foreign firms may exploit their cost advantage  by bidding just below what they expect domestic firms to
bid, which will be substantially higher fian their actual cost.  A price preference policy will force foreign
firms to lower their bids,  as it increases the effective competition from domestic firns.  While the
preference policy entails that the lowest bidder is not necessarily awarded the contract, thus implying
higher costs to the govermnent, on average the bids made by firms with a cost advantage may be lower
than otherwise.  Of course,  if domestic firms do not have a cost disadvantage, no preferential policy
should be pursued. 21
Economic  arguments for preferences only hold in a small ntunbers setting. If enough foreign and
domestic firms are invited to bid, competition  between them should ensure that the 'market' price is paid.
20/ The new GPA  continues  to contain rather  extensive  language  regarding  special  and differential  treatment  of
develoning countries (Art. V).  Thus allowance is made for such countries not to abide by the GPA's
nondiscrimination principles in order to safeguard the balance of payments; promote the development of local
industry; or to support industrial units "so long as they are substantially dependent on govermnent
procurement."  AlthoLugh,  these provisions are of a 'best endeavors' nature in the sense that Parties to the GPA
'shall,  in the implementation and administration of this Agreement ... duly take into account" the foregoing
'needs',  developing country signatories are given a substantial amount of discretion not to implement the GPA.
21/ It is ironic that the GPA does allow for discrimination against domestic finns,  reflecting the adoption of the
GATT's definition of national treatment.  This requires that policies are "no less favorable'  for foreign firms
than what is applied to domestic ones, thus allowing preferential treatment for foreign products.
14In practice discriminatory government policies can be expected  to be more costly than a national treatment
policy, especially when no competitive tendering is sought or there is an absolute preference for domestic
suppliers.  Indeed, if foreign firms are excluded from bidding for contracts procurement, costs are likely
to  rise  significantly.  Without  going  into the  pro's  and  con's  of  specific decision  rules  in  this
connection,'  what is relevant here is that criteria used in the enforcement of competition policy can be
used to  determine  when to discriminate.  As market structure is  crucial,  and this  is  the focus of
competition enforcement, a competition office could be given the task to ascertain if the conditions calling
for discrimination have been met in individual cases.  The point is that reliance on a general rule of
thumb (e.g.,  international competitive bidding for all contracts above a certain threshold) may not be
appropriate.  But, to diverge from this principle, information/analysis  is needed.  For a price preference
scheme to reduce average procurement costs it is necessary  to obtain information on the costs of foreign
and domestic firms.
The impact of local content criteria on economic efficiency and welfare has been analyzed at
length in the theoretical and policy-oriented economic literature.'  A general theme of this literature
is that there is a need to investigate whether the specific rule that is employed attains the policy goal at
least cost.  In practice, the content requirements may not even be consistent with the underlying policy
goal.  A local content scheme that is intended to protect domestic producers of intermediates is usually
an inferior instrument as alternatives exist that are less costly.  Thus, it is w_l  known that production
subsidies are generally the most efficient means of supporting a specific economic activity.  Another
theme is that policymakers should consider economy-wide  implications. For example, while local content
requirements protect domestic (regional) intermediate goods producers, this raises the costs of production
for final good producers.  By offering protection to producers of intermediates the probability increases
that producers of final goods and services that use these intermediates will also petition for protection.
Local content rules are often used as schemes under which tariff preferences are provided to
firns.  Thus, if the content rule is met firms may be granted exemptions from-or  reductions in-tariffs
on imported inputs.  A key difference between such schemes and local content (offset) requirements in
the procurement setting is that in the latter case satisfying the offset requirement is a necessary condition
for contesting the market.  The firm cannot choose to pay the tariff (or a  higher tariff).  As is well
known, such quantitative restrictions are much more distorting than price-based measuresq  such as tariffs,
or in the case at hand, price preferences.  Indeed, there is a direct analogy between price preferences and
offsets on the one hand, and tariffs and quotas on the other.
Tariffs are superior to quotas on economic grounds  for many reasons.  These include their greater
transparency, less need for regulation and administration, and thus less scope  for capture by vested
22/ Branco  (1994)  explores  some of the practical implications  of this result for the design  of tender procedures.
23/ See, e.g.,  Vousden (1990).
15imerests, and most importantly, the fact that a tariff will always allow the most efficient producers to
maintain their competitive edge vis-a-vis other suppliers.  Even if the necessary conditions for a price
preference policy to he optimal have not been satisfied and a government simply desires to support local
industry, price preferences will be a more efficient instrument than offsets.  It is unfortunate therefore-if
perhaps not surprising 24-that negotiators chose to allow defacto quantitative restriction-like instruments
instead of price-based measures.
The conditional-MFN approach based on reciprocal negotiation of entity lists ('market access')
is another  possible  culprit  underlying continued limited  membership of  the  GPA.  Parties to  the
Agreement have shown a tendency to define reciprocity on a sectoral basis.  Absolute sectoral reciprocity
has been a norm, i.e., a country that schedules its teleconinunications provider(s) will seek to ensure that
other signatories do so as well.  This makes cross-sectoral (cross-entity and/or cross-product) tradeoffs
more difficult, and reduces the potential gains from trade.  For example, as mentioned earlier, a number
of signatories to the new GPA introduced sectoral non-application and/or reciprocity provisions (naaming
the Parties of the GPA to which these exemptions applied) in their Annexes listing the procurement of
services that would be subject to the GPA's rules.  The objective of such provisions was the pursuit of
a sectoral 'level  playing field':  the Parties making exceptions in their Annexes sought to ensure that
market access conditions prevailing abroad would be at least as good as those implied by their own offer.
Some participants viewed these developments-which reflected the move towards sectoral reciprocity in
the GATS context-with  serious misgivings. One signatory to the Tokyo round Agreement-Hong Kong-
felt strongly enough about the resulting weakening of the GPA's nondiscrimination principle to refuse to
sign the new GPA (Messerlin, 1994).
What might be done to expand membership of the GPA, and ultimately to multilateralize the
Agreement? An argument can be made that the 'all or nothing' approach of the current GPA as regards
discrimination is both too purist (not allowing price preferences) and not purist enough (allowing  offsets;
allowing sectoral reciprocity).  Two possibilities arise: (1) pursue 'conditional tariffication': allow price
preferences, subject to a determination  that certain necessary conditions have been met (relating to market
structure, number of bidders,  etc.);  and (2) allow for tariffication of procurement preferences more
generally by developing countries.  The first option is somewhat analogous to the pursuit of common
competition policy disciplines, and may therefore be subject to the general arguments that can be raised
against such efforts (see Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1994). However, as long as agreement can be reached
regarding the  economics of  the issue, progress along this dimension may well be  feasible without
hannonization.  Involvement of national competition-type  bodies could be useful in the procurement area
by establishing if a case exists for allowing the use of price preferences. If disagreements arise as regards
determinations of these bodies, Members could invoke the GPA's dispute settlement procedures.
24/ When  confronted  with the choice  policymakers  often  demonstrate  a distinct  preference  for regulation  of
quantities  rather than using  more efficient  price-based  instruments. See e.g., Messerlin  (1981)  and Deardorff
(1986).
16General tariffication is the more straightforward approach, of course, although not necessarily
the optimal one from an economic perspective.3 It's advantage is the absence of any need to determine
what the necessary conditions for using preferences are, and whether they have been met in particular
instances.  Even though clearly not 'first-best',  allowing for price preferences could prove to be the
simplest and most effective way of multilateralizing the GPA.  Once countries have set/negotiated the
implicit tariffs (price preferences) that they will apply, these price wedges can become the subject of
periodic  multilateral  liberalization efforts  (negotiating rounds). Tariffication can  also  do  much  to
overcome the 'absolute' sectoral reciprocity constraint that has affected GPA talks.  Once 'tariffs'  have
been set, negotiators can follow GATT's well-established  techniques of incremental liberalization, what
Bhagwati (1988) has called the 'first-difference' approach to reciprocity.
In allowing for discrimination through tariffication care should be taken that signatories do not
engage in opportunistic behavior by setting rates at stratospheric levels. But an analogy with agriculture
is perhaps appropriate here.  Although tariffs may be bound at high levels, this may be worth it in terms
of subjecting this sector of activity to multilateral rules, especially if in the process the use of quantitative
measures (quotas in agriculture, offsets here) becomes circumscribed.
The potential gains from trade are pretty clear.  Developing countries offer potential markets for
current signatories, whereas governments that are concerned with miimizing  their budgetary outlays have
a stake in adopting procurement practices that maxnimize  national welfare.  As in other areas, the key
issue appears to be one of information: often it may not be clear to policymakers what procurement policy
is the most beneficial. As is the case for services as regards the costs and benefits of regulatory regimes,
very little is known about the way that goods and services are procured by most governments, and the
opportunity costs of current practices.  Indeed, often basic information on the practices and procedures
that are pursued are not readily available.  Examples include the share of contracts that are awarded to
foreign suppliers; and  the conditions that  are  actually inmposed  in  terms of  local  content  or  price
preferences on a case-by-case basis.
A 'transparency' body could therefore make a very useful contribution to policy formation by
evaluating  procurement policies and practices.  An obvious step in this direction would be to expand the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (IPRM)  to procurement for those WTO Members that have signed the
GPA.  The GPA already requires Parties to report statistics to the Committee that allow for an analysis
of sourcing practices.  However, these data are not published, and have not been used for analytical
purposes.  As was the case with the acceptance of the TPRM in 1988, although most countries will not
25( See Deardorff  and Stem (1985) and Herander  (1982)  for an analysis  of the tariff-equivalent  of price
preferences. In gener  a 10 percent preference  may not be equivalent  to a 10  percent tariff for an entity
because  entrpreneurs in the  country  have an incetive to import  goods,  proces them enough  to be considered
'local' and then sell them to the entity.  For the economy  as a whole, a 10 percent  preference  wil only be
equivalent  to a 10 percent  tariff if the Goverment  entity is the only buyer of the product.
17have much desire to subject themselves to a transparency-based  review of their procurement policies, the
benefit of obtaining information on trading partners may outweigh the perceived cost of being subjected
to review as well.
Before concluding, the question should be posed whether tariffication will be acceptable  to OECD
and other high income countries that have objections to the GPA.  Of the OECD countries, Australia,
Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey are not members of the GPA.  Australia and New Zealand appear not
to have joined because they wish to maintain price preference policies (MacAfee and McMillan, 1989).
The same is probably true for Mexico and Turkey.  Such countries could therefore support tariffication.
This may not be the case for countries that favor nondiscrimination. Singapore, a signatory of the Tokyo
round agreement, has not become a member of the n-  GPA.  Hong Kong, another member  of the
Tokyo round code,  also refused to sign, in part because it felt that the new GPA had weakened its
nondiscrimiination requirements too  much (Messerlin,  1994).26  Tariffication will make  the  GPA
substantially less  'pure',  and  thus may not please those WTO  Members  that already perceive the
Agreement as being too weak.  The elimination of the offset loophole and the a substantial expansion of
merrbership might, however, provide a counterweight for such Members.
V.  Concluding Remarks
The coverage of the GPA was significantly expanded as a result of the negotiations that were held
during  the  Uruguay  round.  Its  enforcement provisions  were  strengthened,  in  particular  by  the
introduction of a bid-protest challenge mechanism. These are very innovative for the GATT-MTN system
in that they allow private parties (firms) to invoke the GPA before national courts.  In the process,
however, potential problems have been created, due to the possibility of diverging interpretations of the
GPA by domestic courts.  Time will tell whether this possibility is realized.  Much was done to enhance
transparency of procurement  practices of signatories.  Further  strengthening  could be  achieved by
requiring that the publication of contract awards (already required) include a brief motivation of decisions
(presently not required).  Multilateral 'surveillance' of procurement practices could also be strengthened
substantially  by giving the WTO Secretariat the mandate to analyze the statistics on procurement that are
submitted to the Comnnittee each year.
Membership of the GPA remains limited.  Indeed, at the entry into force of the new GPA there
may be fewer signatories than at the beginning of the Uruguay Round.  Inducing greater participation is
26/ The  new GPA  gives Hong  Kong  and Korea until January 1, 1997  to apply  the Agreement. However, Hong
Kong  decided in April 1994  (just one week before  the Mankesh  meeting  formally  concluding  the Umguay
Round)  not to join.  It can be noted that the EU has stated  in its annexes  that GPA rules for services
procurement  will only apply  to Spanish  entities  as of January 1, 1997,  and for Greek and Portuguese  entities  as
of January 1, 1998.
18important as  procurement is  the  last  major 'hole'  in  the  GAIT.  Addressing the  issue of
'multilateralizing'  the GPA  should  be given priority  by policymakers.  Public  procurement  constitutes  a
large source  of demand  for goods  and services  in most countries. Getting  domestic  procurement  policies
'right' therefore  can have  large  welfare  effects. At the same  time, improving  developing  country  access
to global  procurement  markets  could help to induce  Government's  to adopt  multilateral  rules if these  can
be shown  to be in their interests. Perhaps  the most immediate  source  of urgency  stems  from the General
Agreement  on Trade in  Services (GATS), which contains a provision calling for negotiations  on
government  procurement  of services  to be initiated  within  two  years  of the entry into force of the WTO
(i.e., January 1997). The rules and procedures  that  are negotiated  will be important  in determining  the
potential  for growth  in developing  country  exports of services. The fact that the GPA was somewhat
'infected'  by the  GATS-which  takes  a sector-specific  approach  to liberalization--through  the introduction
of sectoral  non-application  and reciprocity  conditions  is worrisome  in this connection.
Pursuit of tariffication  could be an avenue through which membership  in the GPA can be
expanded  in the future. In the process, the GPA could  be improved  from an economic  perspective  by
elimninating  current loopholes  that allow for measures with quota-like  effects, and weakening the
incentives  to pursue 'absolute' reciprocity. More generally,  research  efforts are required to identify
possible  approaches  towards  extending  multilateral  disciplines  for procurement  of goods  and services  that
will be beneficial  to developing  countries,  and thus be helpful  in formulating  negotiating  positions  and
strategies. Such research  should emphasize  two issues. The first is to anaiyze in greater depth the
economics  of the GPA's rules and disciplines,  investigate  what the impact  of the Agreement  has been,
and  explore  what  might  be done to expand  its membership.  The second  pertains  to obtaining  inl.ormnation
on current  procurement  policies  in non-member  countries  and  the quantitative  importance  of prucurement
markets in major selected  OECD and developing  countries.
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21Table 1: Thresholds  in Annexes  1.2 and 3 of the GPA
Special  Drawing  Rights  (SDR)
SDR I equals approx SUS  1.4 (1994)
Austria  Canada  EC  Finland  Israel  Japan  Korea  Norway  Sweden  CH  US
Annex I
Goods  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130.000  130,000  130,000  130,000
Services  except
construction  service  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130,000  130.000
constiruction  services  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5.000,000  8,500,000  4,500,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000
Architect.
services:
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ___  _____  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  450 ,000  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Annex 2
Goods  200,000  355,000  200,000  200,000  250,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  355,000
Services  except
construction  Service  200,000  355,000  200,000  200,000  250,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  355,000
Construction  Services  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  8,500,000  15,000,000  15,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000
Architect.
services:
____________________  __________  __________  ~1,500,000  _  _  _  _  _
Annex 3
Goods  400,000  355,000  400,000  400,000  355,000  130,000  450,000  400,000  400,000  400,000  400,000
Services  except
consiruction  services  400,000  355,000  400,000  400,000  355,000  130,000  400,000  400,000  400,000  400,000




Annex 1:  Central government  entities
Annex  2:  Sub-central  govermnent  entities
Annex  3:  All other entities  which  procure  in accordance  with  the Agreement,  in general  public  enterprises  or public  authorities  or public  authorities  such as Utilities.
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